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Crowdwork involves paid work organised through online platforms. As a relatively new form of 
employment, a range of issues have emerged around work practices and contractual arrangements 
between the three parties: task requesters, crowdworkers, and platform owners. In this paper we 
examine some of the issues associated with workers’ experience of crowdwork that have been raised in 
recent years. We then outline how the affordances offered by another emerging technology, blockchain, 
could be used to address some of those issues. Based on a conceptual, scenario-based exercise, we argue 
that there is considerable potential for blockchain technology to manage the transaction-based aspects 
of crowdwork processes and contractual arrangements to make them fairer and more transparent, but 
without necessarily incurring excessive overhead costs. However, despite the claimed “democratizing” 
effect of blockchain, some structural issues associated with managing work are not likely to be improved 
by blockchain-based solutions.  
Keywords: Crowdwork, ethics, contracts, blockchain 
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1 Introduction 
Crowdwork appears to offer opportunities for accessing skills required by organisations flexibly and cost 
effectively. The benefits of crowdwork for businesses have been pointed out in a number of recent studies 
(Prpić et al. 2015; Thuan et al. 2016). These have found that crowdwork can increase flexibility and lower 
costs. However, there is also a ‘dark side’ to crowdwork. Major crowdwork sites, such as Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (AMT) platform1, have been the subject of extensive criticism with regard to the labour 
practices they enable (Ettlinger 2016; Silberman and Irani 2016). ‘Turkers’, as the community of regular 
workers who derive some or all of their income from performing tasks on AMT, have complained of low 
wages, poor responsiveness to questions or disputes, unclear task descriptions, and requesters (those 
who set the tasks) rejecting work without due cause or adequate explanation (Silberman and Irani 2016).  
Protection against unethical practices is one of the reasons we have laws governing work. In response to 
concerns about worker security and working conditions, many national and international bodies 
developed labour laws including (for example) protections against child labour2, or more contested laws 
such as those governing the minimum wage. Recently, technology innovations are creating, inter alia, 
opportunities for new labour practices. There is a risk that crowdwork can become the modern digital 
equivalent of a sweatshop, trading mainly in insecure, low-paid, digital piece work3. To counter this, in 
some countries, crowdworkers are starting to establish unions, and establish rating systems for 
crowdwork platforms and issuers (Silberman and Irani 2016). The authors acknowledge that fair-
practice in the workcontext4 needs to be a negotiation between all parties, including employers, 
employees, and other stakeholders including outsourcers and contractors. However, for this initial 
study, we concentrate on issues associated with crowdworkers.  
Interestingly, another emerging technology – blockchain – offers the opportunities to restructure 
aspects of crowdwork to make the processes more ethical and transparent. In this conceptual and 
scenario-based paper, we examine working conditions associated with crowdwork and the potential for 
blockchain-based technologies to manage these issues. 
The design of technologies has been argued to contain embedded values (Sclove 1995). Since workers in 
some contexts can now be largely “managed” by software, we believe the academic community has an 
important role to play in initiating dialogue about the risks and mitigation strategies of these new 
management models. We believe we should aim to lead thinking about the values embedded in 
technologies for managing the changing workcontext, rather than simply studying the problems that 
arise post-hoc. In this context, scenario-based research has been found to be valuable for producing 
interesting, challenging and forward-looking insights (Ramireza et al. 2015). 
2 Background Literature 
2.1 Crowdwork 
Crowdwork is a subset of a wider phenomenon known as crowdsourcing, a term coined in 2006 to 
describe the phenomenon whereby “a function once performed by employees [is outsourced] to an 
undefined (and generally large) network of people in the form of an open call’’ (Howe 2006, p.1). Since 
then, understanding of the types, nature and roles of crowdsourcing have advanced rapidly. Crowds may 
be used for voting, to source ideas and innovations, and to perform tasks. These include both tasks that 
were at one time carried out by employees, and tasks that probably would never have been carried out 
at all in the absence of a crowd platform. The tasks may be paid or unpaid, and highly skilled, or 
minimally skilled. The focus of this paper is paid crowdwork, which can be carried out at a number of 
different levels. Larger, more complex, pieces of work that require specific skills, for example, developing 
a research paper, a piece of business writing, or a video, are often described as ‘macro-tasks’. However, 
a large proportion of paid crowdwork falls into the category of micro-tasking. Micro-tasking is a specific 
sort of crowdwork that involves dividing a larger piece of work into many very small, repeatable pieces. 
Typically (but not always) these do not require any specific skills to complete, and individual tasks can 
be completed very quickly (within minutes). Micro-tasking is organised with a ‘crowd’ of workers, 
requesters, and a platform provider who connects the crowd of workers with those seeking crowdwork.  
                                                        
1 https://www.mturk.com 
2 For example, The International Labour Organization Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment 
3 In piece work, the worker gets paid based on the number of “pieces” or work they complete. Each piece is worth a certain 
amount.  
4 We use the term “workcontext” to capture the intersection of place, task, and employment terms and conditions in which work 
is carried out, as crowdwork is generally not associated with a single ‘workplace’. 
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The ‘crowd’ are generally considered to be independent contractors by the platform owner, not 
employees (Felstiner 2011). There are a number of platforms available for organising micro-tasking, 
including CrowdFlower and Microtask.  The earliest and still largest crowd-sourcing platform, and 
therefore one of the most-studied, is AMT. Macro-tasking works similarly, but is based around larger 
pieces of work that typically require some level of skill. Popular macro tasks are coding, software testing, 
usability testing, translations and graphic design. Many are targeted towards specific market niches or 
with specific value propositions, for example Mylittlejob5, which is based in Germany and concentrates 
on students looking for short term work. 
2.2 The relationship between the parties involved in crowdwork 
There are generally at least three parties involved in crowdwork, the platform, the requester, and the 
worker. There is some variation as to the extent to which the terms of service are set: 1) at the platform 
level, where all requesters and workers using that platform must use the same terms of service; and 2) 
at the individual requester level, who determines task requirements and constraints, as well as the rate 
of pay. Felstiner (2011) notes that AMT is more than just a “glorified job listing service”, nor is it a 
“passive middleman in a supply chain”, nor does it fall under the concepts of sub-contracting, 
outsourcing of services, or temporary staffing. It has a direct contractual role with the other two parties 
(its “Terms of Service”). Thus AMT designates crowdworkers as independent contractors, and “sets all 
the ground rules regarding qualifications for work, supervision, payment, dispute resolution, and access 
to the platform.” (p.151). The requesters and workers have no facility available to negotiate their own 
contract, yet if there are disputes, AMT tend not to get involved. Felstiner goes on to say:  
“In high-volume crowdsourcing, the prospect of a sequence of hundreds or thousands of independent 
contracts, lasting a few minutes apiece and producing pennies in compensation, seems slightly 
ridiculous. But as with any independent contractor designation, the impact is serious. The posture of 
the law towards nearly every aspect of the employment relationship depends on that threshold 
classification. Independent contractors are not covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and related anti-
discrimination legislation, the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act (OSHA), or other similar federal statutes.” (p.170).  
The implications are considerable, as in the event that crowdwork becomes a more dominant model for 
obtaining work, and if the independent contractor designation remains unchallenged, this would 
effectively remove these protections from a large segment of the workforce. This risk is part of the 
motivation for our study. To avoid unnecessarily complicating the discussion, we acknowledge that 
workcontext issues can arise with either the platform or the requester (or both), depending on the exact 
configuration of each platform.  
2.3 Blockchain 
Blockchain technology can be conceptualised as a fully distributed database of transactions, which 
consists of ‘chains’ of timestamped and cryptographically verified ‘blocks’ of data. The notion of a chain 
of blocks gained traction in the Internet community when Nakamoto (2008) introduced it as a critical 
component of the cyber currency Bitcoin, a peer-to-peer electronic cash system. Subsequently, the 
underlying technology which supported Bitcoin became known as ‘Blockchain’ and was recognised as 
an enabler of new applications beyond Bitcoin, sometimes referred to as ‘the trust protocol’ and ‘the 
internet of value’ (e.g., Tapscott and Tapscott 2016).  Applications of blockchain have expanded far 
beyond cryptocurrencies. Swan (2015) describes the development of Blockchain according to its 
application domains: currencies and payment systems (Blockchain 1.0), contracts in relation to 
economic, market, and financial applications (Blockchain 2.0) and applications beyond currency, 
finance, and markets, particularly in the areas of government, health, science, literacy, culture, and art 
(Blockchain 3.0). Blockchain is often described broadly as a distributed ledger to record and verify 
transactions between parties related to asset ownership and transfer or, more broadly, any kind of value 
(e.g., Beck and Müller-Bloch 2017; Brakeville and Perepa 2016; Iansiti and Lakhani 2017). Iansiti and 
Lakhani (2017) define five basic characteristics of Blockchain technology: (1) distributed database, 2) 
peer-to-peer communication, 3) transparency with pseudonymity, (4) irreversibility of records, and (5) 
computational logic that can be tied to transactions. To these we add: 6) trust mechanism, and 7) 
networked integrity.  
Distributed database (with peer-to peer communication): Blockchain transactions are fully distributed 
– every node associated with the blockchain has a historical record of every transaction since the 
                                                        
5 https://www.mylittlejob.com/ 
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beginning of the chain. No single party can shut the system down (Tapscott and Tapscott 2016). 
Communication occurs peer-to-peer, not through a central node or authority (Iansiti and Lakhani 2017). 
We define the distributed database concept as: power to post transactions, and create blocks across a 
peer-to-peer network with no single point of control. Note that this does not necessarily mean that every 
node contains a full copy of everything associated with the transaction. For example, a blockchain might  
create a record that a movie had been streamed so that royalties can be paid, this does not necessarily 
mean that an entire copy of the movie itself would be associated with every transaction and distributed 
to every node on the blockchain each time a related transaction is posted.  
Transparency with pseudonymity: Each node on a blockchain is identified by an alphanumeric address. 
Every transaction on the blockchain is associated with an address and is visible to every other node. This 
means that transactions are fully transparent but the user’s identity can be hidden, unless the user 
chooses to disclose it (Iansiti and Lakhani 2017).  
Irreversibility of records: The essence of the blockchain is the cryptographic hash that validates 
transactions and allows transactions to be verified and blocks of transactions to be closed off and added 
to the chain. The hash of each transaction is added to the block hash, and the hash of the block is added 
to the next block. This provides an irreversible ‘chain’. In Bitcoin, the hash value calculated must also be 
smaller than current cut-off point determined by the network, known as ‘the difficulty’, in order for a 
new block to be accepted. This means that millions of candidate hash values will be calculated, but very 
few of them will meet ‘the difficulty’.  Therefore enormous computing power is required to continuously 
generate candidate hash values. Payment in Bitcoins recognises the computing effort that has gone into 
producing a block, and is known as payment based on ‘proof of work’6.  In a public ledger (we return to 
the differences between public and private ledgers shortly) – anyone with computing power available 
can register, post transactions and if they choose to, join in attempting to solve blocks (bitcoin ‘mining’).  
We define irreversibility of transactions as: Transactions, once entered, cannot be altered or updated as 
they are cryptographically linked to all other transactions.  
Smart contracts (computational logic that can be tied to transactions): Since the blockchain is entirely 
digital it has the properties of other digital objects, including programmability (Yoo et al. 2010). This 
means that transactions on the blockchain can be triggered by rules, algorithms and computational logic. 
Smart contracts can be seen as cryptographic ‘boxes’ that contain value and only unlock it if certain 
conditions are met” (Buterin 2014).  
Trust mechanism: Based on the ‘irreversibility of transaction records’ functionality described above, 
blockchains also provide a cryptographically assured and distributed trust mechanism for all 
transactions.  Swan (2015) sees the blockchain as the main technological innovation of Bitcoin because 
it creates a so-called ‘trustless7’ proof mechanism of all the transactions on the network. We define the 
trust mechanism as: Trust in transactions that is intrinsic to the transactions and the network itself, not 
extrinsic.  
Networked integrity: “Safety measures are embedded in the network with no single point of failure, and 
they provide not only confidentiality, but also authenticity and nonrepudiation to all activity.” (Tapscott 
and Tapscott 2016, p.39). We define networked integrity as: confidentiality, authenticity and non-
repudiation provided at the network level. 
As an emerging technology, blockchain is still evolving. Some of the newer developments are related to 
private and hybrid blockchains, and intersecting chains. 
Public, private and hybrid blockchains: Blockchain technology is also being utilised in private ledgers. 
Private ledgers use some central control to manage who has permission to create transactions on the 
ledger.  In a fully private ledger, write-permissions are monitored by a central locus of decision-making. 
Read-permissions are either public or restricted (Buterin 2014). A private blockchain can be considered 
as a permissioned ledger, where the identity of the nodes (members) on the blockchain are known (to 
the permissioning authority, at least, though not necessarily to each other). Hybrid models are also 
possible, also described as ‘consortium blockchains’ (Buterin 2014), and they are composed of a mixture 
of low-trust (i.e. public blockchains) and the single, permissioned entity model (i.e. private blockchains. 
Transactions in private and hybrid blockchains can be validated using a number of alternative 
mechanisms, ‘proof of stake’ (PoS) and ‘proof of authority’ (PoA). Validators are a group of 
accounts/nodes that are allowed to participate in the consensus; they validate the transactions and 
                                                        
6 There are also mechanisms for paying contributors who do not solve a block, see for example (ref) 
7 This term can result in confusion. In the blockchain context, it means that trust is embedded in the blockchain itself, and no 
recourse is required to additional trust mechanisms external to the system, hence the term “trustless” 
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blocks. For PoW the validators are miners who get rewarded for their effort, for PoS the validators are 
those that with an (economic) stake who can get penalised, for PoA the validators are those that are 
explicitly authorised. 
Note these principles remain true for private and hybrid blockchains once a node or entity is added to 
the network. Private and hybrid chains have gatekeepers which typically control ‘right to post’ into the 
network, so control over entry to the network may be vested in a specific party. The network’s 
governance structure may also control the nature and rules governing transactions. Therefore it is not 
inherent in private or hybrid blockchains that the rights of all parties will be equally represented. For 
example an educational institution might include, as one of its terms that the entire academic transcript 
of student would be available to legitimate requesters, including any failed papers.   What is inherent is 
that the network will consistently follow whatever rules are agreed upon for its configuration.   
Cross-chain protocols for transactions involving intersecting chains: Selecting a public or private chain, 
and associated validation mechanisms, may limit the business applications of blockchain. For example, 
most people would agree that only credentialed medical practitioners should be able to add to their 
medical records, or that educational qualifications should only be added by recognised institutions. 
These suggest an important role for hybrid chains where write access (the ability to create records) is 
controlled. However, a person applying for a higher level crowdwork assignment might need their 
credentials for that assignment checked by the crowdwork platform (read access). An ideal solution 
would permit multiple parallel blockchains to interoperate and exchange transactions with each other 
while retaining their own security and integrity. However, this is very difficult to manage in a proof-of-
work context. How can the ‘cross-chain’ transactions be recognised and rewarded? Protocols and 
software are beginning to emerge for managing interblock transactions and exchanges. One such 
example is the Cosmos Hub, which is an inter-blockchain communication (IBC) protocol. Exchanges are 
carried out between blockchains (called ‘zones’) using tokens. Inter-zone token transfers go through the 
Cosmos Hub, which keeps track of the total amount of tokens held by each zone. The hub serves the 
function of isolating each zone from the others, and preserving the integrity of each. New zones 
(blockchains) can be connected to the hub, making it extensible to add future new blockchain-based 
applications. 
3 Crowdworker Workcontext Management 
Workcontext laws, guidelines and codes of conduct originate broadly within the domain of business 
ethics, based on values of fairness, exchange and acceptable conduct. They are enforced via labour laws. 
Labour laws may form an important part of political campaigns, and may be considered to broadly 
reflect the social contract regarding the terms and conditions governing work that are considered 
acceptable to the citizens of a country at a point in time. We note that workcontext laws vary considerably 
between nations. It is widely recognised that new forms of employment are testing the boundaries of 
current workcontext laws in many countries. Stone (2006) offers an extensive analysis of some of the 
issues as they are currently being experienced in the USA, including retirement security, health and 
safety protections, and employment discrimination. Labour laws have not entirely caught up with 
crowdworking. Workcontext issues have been identified in academic literature, on crowdworker forums, 
and in crowdworker advocacy sites.  
3.1 The Basic Processes of Crowdwork: Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) 
The most-studied crowdwork platform is AMT, so we use AMT’s processes as a proxy for the basic 
processes involved in managing crowdwork. It has been estimated that there are more than half a million 
workers registered with AMT, although not all of them are active8. The basic process used to request and 
sign-up for work is as follows. Requesters break their requirements down into micro-tasks, called on 
AMT ‘HITs’ or ‘human intelligence tasks’. The individual micro-tasks are divided into groups 
(assignments) made up of a set of equivalent tasks (for example, photo-tagging). The groups are posted 
on the AMT platform, with a title, description of the requester, and the reward. The requester transfers 
sufficient money, in advance, to AMT to cover both worker payments and AMT’s commission (a 
minimum of 20% of the money paid to workers, at the time of writing). One form of quality assurance 
for requesters is to include each micro-task in several different groups, so they get multiple results for 
the same task. Sometimes requesters will also specify specific skills which workers must have. Workers 
search assignments, and decide which ones to accept. They then carry out the work. The requester 
collates all the completed assignments and evaluates them. Based on the evaluation, requesters approve 
                                                        
8 http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/07/11/the-size-of-the-mechanical-turk-marketplace/ 
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or reject each assignment completed by a worker. Importantly, this decision is at the discretion of the 
requester, and only accepted assignments are paid for. Assignments must be accepted or rejected within 
the timeframe specified in the listing. If they are not explicitly rejected they are eventually considered to 
be accepted. For accepted assignments, the worker automatically receives the agreed payment via the 
AMT platform, and AMT receives their commission.  Over time, a worker’s reputation, based on the 
number of accepted and rejected pieces of work they have submitted, is maintained by AMT and made 
available to requesters seeking high-quality workers. AMT, notably, take little interest in disputes over 
assignments, and the discretion available to the requester leaves many to believe that the power balance 
is deliberately tilted in the requester’s favour, and AMT are complicit in this (Silberman and Irani 2016).   
3.2 Crowdworker Advocacy 
Unsurprisingly, support and advocacy communities for crowdworkers are beginning to emerge. 
‘Turkers’ have supported each other in various forums almost since the inception of AMT9. For example, 
requester reputations, based on characteristics like whether or not they offer good pay rates, accept 
reasonable quality work, and provide clear instructions for tasks, are not maintained by AMT. In 
response, researchers Lilly Irani and M. Six Silberman developed software (Turkopticon) to enable 
workers to maintain their own requester reputation system (Irani and Silberman 2013). Turkopticon10  
has been operating as a portal of resources for Turkers.   
Originating in Europe, a consortium of organisations prepared a white paper (the Frankfurt Paper on 
Platform-Based Work 11) outlining principles for fair, equitable and transparent crowdwork.  In the 
absence of a large body of academic research, we have used crowdworkers’ advocacy site 
Faircrowd.work, in combination with research on AMT, to profile crowdworkers’ employment concerns 
on the basis that a worker’s advocacy site would provide a reasonable proxy for the viewpoint of 
crowdworkers. The focus on the European market, with its tradition of unionisation and more 
collaborative relationships between workers and employers12, also gave us confidence that this site is 
likely to surface a representative range of issues. Faircrowd.work13 offers advice and information (“did 
you know there are unions for crowdworkers?”); and reviews and ratings in a variety of categories for a 
range of crowdwork platforms operating mainly in the European market.  
3.3 Summary of Task and Worker-Related Issues 
3.3.1 Task related 
Unsurprisingly, given the central nature of the task for micro and macro task workers, there are issues 
associated with task management, including clarity, acceptance of completed work, and variations to the 
task. These issues are inter-related.   
Contractual clarity and variations: Unclear contracts can occur when, for example, the requester is 
relatively inexperienced, and provides a task description that is vague or ambiguous (Felstiner 2011; 
Silberman and Irani 2016). This makes it difficult for the crowdworker to understand exactly what is 
required, and increases the likelihood that the worker will need to communicate with the requester, or 
that the work will eventually be rejected if the task cannot be clarified. There is also a possibility that a 
variation to the task request will be required, especially for macro-tasks. Faircrowd.work include 
“changes to the terms of service” as one of the dimensions they evaluate for each platform. We define 
this issue as: the clarity of the contract and the terms and conditions under which the task can be 
modified.  
Warranty and rejected work: This is the source of a great deal of friction for AMT workers. Currently, 
the requester is able to reject submitted work (including declining payment) at their discretion. Reasons 
why work submitted by a Worker is rejected by the Requester, as described by Silberman and Irani 
(2016) and Felstiner (2011), fall into a number of categories. 1) The worker did not provide quality work, 
either because they tried in good faith, but did not succeed, or because they did not genuinely attempt 
to meet the task requirements or quality standards. This could be because they hoped that a sub-
standard task might still be accepted and paid for. 2) Lack of conceptual clarity around the task 
requirements (as above). 3) Sometimes, the worker may decide there is too much to do to complete the 
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task based on the time or payment offered. In all of these situations, the worker may submit work that 
is incomplete, poorly done, or rushed, or may simply abandon the task. All of these count (in terms of 
the workers reputation) as rejected work. Sometimes even quality work is rejected. This can occur when 
automated software evaluates the completed work and makes a mistake, or when the requester rejects 
work to avoid having to pay for it, despite knowing that it is acceptable. If work is rejected, AMT does 
not get paid their commission. Apart from that, there are relatively few consequences or impacts for 
AMT, who have a track record of having a very ‘hands off’ approach to disputes. There is a field where 
requesters are obliged to enter a reason for rejection, but the requirement is not policed and can be met 
by just entering a single character. By contrast, the European, largely macrotasking platforms evaluated 
by Faircrowd.work, are rated on their approach to ‘warranty’, which is the commitment to returning 
work for correction before work is rejected or payment withheld. While not all platforms are well rated 
in this respect, there is a general acceptance that spurious rejection of work is an unacceptable practice. 
We define this issue as: Fair management of quality, so that workers have a chance to correct work that 
is initially not accepted, and requesters cannot spuriously reject work without reason or to avoid 
payment. 
Payment: This is closely related to the issue of warranty and rejected work, as rejected work is not paid 
for. Slow payment is generally not an issue on AMT as the reward is automatically paid after a certain 
period of time, however, the requester may be slow to accept/reject, thereby delaying payment even 
though they can use the work immediately. Faircrowd.work provide worker ratings for each platform on 
pay, broken down into rates, pay ranges, and non-payment experiences. The ‘terms of service’ checklist 
for each platform that is evaluated, covers the ability to refuse payment. We define this issue as: Fair pay 
rates and prompt payment. 
Communication: As part of their policy enforcement and guidelines for good practice, AMT encourages 
Workers and Requesters to communicate with each other and with AMT, where problems occur. In 
practice, however, this has proved consistently problematic. Requesters are not required to respond, 
and often don’t. Similarly, any complaints from Workers relating to perceived unfair rejections of work 
or lack of explanations from Requesters for rejections receive minimal or no response (Felstiner 2011; 
Silberman and Irani 2016). Faircrowd.work allows workers to rate platforms14 on ‘communication’ 
which includes the ability to communicate with management, clients and other workers. Any 
prohibitions on communication are also noted.  We define this issue as: The extent to which 
communication with the requester, the end client (if different), and co-workers is permitted or 
encouraged. 
Task ethics: There have also been issues with the AMT platform issuing tasks that are not ethical – for 
example paying workers to vote in competitions, promote products, services or opinions, or violate 
intellectual property rights (Felstiner 2011; Silberman and Irani 2016). Faircrowd.work allows workers 
to rate platforms according to the type of tasks, including whether they were demeaning, dangerous or 
ethically questionable. We define this issue as: The extent to which the task is demeaning or incurs 
physical or psychological risks 
3.3.2 Worker related 
Task issues aggregate to issues associated with workers reputations, which in turn affect their ability to 
obtain further work. Since crowd platforms are very public forums, privacy is also a potential issue 
(Durward et al. 2016). 
Privacy and identity management: AMT collects a considerable amount of personal data about workers 
during registration, including full name, email & physical address, as well as information used to help 
requesters seeking workers who fall within a certain domain (constraints, for example, based on age, 
employment status or income). Data is also collected and stored through the use of cookies, as well as 
personal information from ‘other’ (unspecified) sources.  AMT does provide a ‘Privacy Notice’ on their 
website, and although they indicate that “we are not in the business of selling it to others”, there are 
nevertheless a range of situations where the information may be ‘shared’, including with requesters, and 
what those entities may do with the data. We define this issue as: Preservation of worker privacy so that 
identity details are not disclosed to the network (relevant details such as credentials may be exposed). 
Reputation management: Work that is not completed or not accepted on AMT affects the reputation of 
the worker, regardless of the reason why the problem occurred. Since a worker’s rating is essential to 
their ability to obtain future work, and to gain increased status, this has a direct effect on their ability to 
                                                        
14 AMT by contrast tends to be a very disengaged platform, so issues are not resolved at platform level but devolve to individual 
workers and requesters.  
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work. We define this issue as: Fair maintenance of reputation management records, so that worker 
reputations cannot be damaged by spurious actions of requesters, including the usefulness, fairness, 
respectfulness, and timeliness of evaluations. Faircrowd.work includes evaluation (the usefulness, 
fairness, respectfulness and timeliness of worker evaluations) as an important rating criteria for 
platforms. We do not examine requester-related issues at this time, but we note that many issues are 
inter-related. For example, a reliable reputation management system for requesters might influence 
whether a worker would accept a job. 
3.4 Scenario 
Jim wants to carry out a 2-week long user interface evaluation assignment issued on a specialised crowd 
platform for user interface design and testing. This particular platform uses blockchain-based smart 
contracts to manage the assignments. The assignment sounds interesting and asks for evaluation 
techniques Jim is familiar with. The issuer has a good reputation in the blockchain managed reputation 
system. The pay rate is a fixed price for the job and looks acceptable considering Jim will be able to work 
from home and will get some savings in commuting costs. In order to bid for the assignment, Jim 
receives a request to release his formal credentials in user interface design, his reputation on the site, 
and his country of residence and tax status. Jim agrees to the request to validate his university degree 
and subsequent industry training courses – fortunately all the institutions he studied with participate in 
one of the credential management chains used by the crowd site15. Jim doesn’t have a reputation yet, so 
the smart contract asks him if he will consent to taking a short test which will take about 30 minutes. If 
he passes and is awarded the job, a small additional fee will be added to his contract fee. If he does not 
pass the test he will receive nothing, and will not be awarded the job. Jim takes the test, passes, and is 
awarded the assignment.  
Transactions for accepting the test, taking the test, and passing the test are all recorded on the 
crowdwork platform blockchain. If he failed the test, that would be recorded too. Whether the test 
attempt was publically recorded against his alias, or was a transaction that issuers could ask for or Jim 
could choose to make visible, would be a policy matter for the crowd site. After one week he is less than 
half way through. He contacts the issuer to dispute the time estimate. The issuer responds that they are 
using multiple testers, the others are more experienced and faster. The dispute is settled in favour of the 
requester. Jim works longer hours than he expected, but completes the assignment. His work is 
evaluated and compared with the other testers who have also been assigned the same interface to 
evaluate. For one of the use-cases he evaluated, the two other evaluators both identify several issues that 
Jim did not identify. Although Jim’s work was not poor enough to be rejected, he does not receive a 
perfect score for that use case, and he receives a 4.5/5-star reputation rating for the job, and receives 
full payment.  
The contract is able to automatically exchange information with Jim’s bank’s blockchain(s), and to verify 
his tax status on the tax office blockchain, so payment is made including tax deduction. Jim gives the 
requester a good rating in most categories. They were responsive and fair, but he still nurtures a 
suspicion that they deliberately underestimated the time required for the job. The dispute exchange is 
also recorded as a series of transactions associated with the contract. The extent to which this is able to 
be publicly viewed is also a policy matter for the crowd platform. There needs to be a balance between 
transparency and privacy (even though identities are disguised with aliases).  The smart contract has 
interacted using an IBC exchange protocol with a qualifications validation blockchain, and a bank and 
tax blockchain. It has recorded transactions on the crowd platform blockchain(s) for accepting the test, 
sitting the test, passing the test, accepting the assignment, disputing the time estimate, resolving the 
dispute, evaluating and accepting the work, Jim’s rating from the requester, the requester’s rating from 
Jim.  
4 Using Blockchain to Address Crowdwork Workcontext 
Management Issues 
4.1 Task Related 
Contractual clarity and variations: Blockchain technologies will not assist in making sure that a contract 
for work is clear in the first-place or in removing the need for contract variations. However, 
irreversibility and networked integrity mean that any contract variation, once published, will be 
visible to the network, irreversible, and applied equally. In our scenario, if Jim’s query has resulted in a 
                                                        
15 Various examples are emerging, for example, VIVA’s introduces POETS (Proof of Educational Transcript System). 
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variation to the contract, it would have been applied to the other workers as well. Smart contracts are 
also likely to result in increased conceptual clarity, as the terms of the contract need to be programmable.  
Warranty and rejected work: Blockchain technology could assist with many of the issues associated with 
rejected work. Although this would depend on the terms that are programmed into the smart contract, 
blockchain technology could potentially provide an audit trail of the history of all transactions associated 
with a piece of work, including opening it, evaluating it, scoring it, accepting (or rejecting) it, and 
generating payment. It could also potentially record any subsequent accesses (if, for example, the 
requester opened the work with a view to using it without accepting/paying for it), and ensure timely 
payment by generating payment as soon as the work is accepted. This would address many of the areas 
of friction in the AMT process (assuming the governance of the site included a responsibility to make 
these transactions visible to the network). In Jim’s case, records would be created of the score he was 
awarded for each of his use-cases, including being notified that he was not aligned with the two other 
testers for one use case. This could enable him to improve his work in the future, and in any event makes 
the evaluation and warranty of the work fully transparent. The trust mechanism would ensure that 
these transactions were assured, auditable, and irreversible. Networked integrity provides 
assurance against loss or damage to any part of the work or the contract. However, for larger pieces of 
work, the distributed nature of the database could make replicating the entire task details across every 
node in the network (as opposed to simply recording transactions associated with the task) unwieldy.  
Payment: As well as the smart contract functionality that ensured that timely and accurate payment 
was generated as soon as work was accepted, there is potential for many of the financial and tax 
headaches associated with crowdwork to be managed by cross-chain protocols. This functionality is 
not yet mature. A possible payment scenario could include: Jim’s tax number and tax status are verified 
by the crowdwork chain using an IBC protocol to contact a hybrid public-records blockchain managed 
by the tax department in Jim’s country of residence, and his payment is released. Based on the tax status 
returned from the tax department, appropriate deductions (for example, for tax or superannuation) are 
made from Jim’s payment, and trusted, irreversible records of those transactions are recorded on 
his tax blockchain which he can refer to at any time. Using IBC protocol again, a transaction for the 
balance to be paid to Jim is generated via his bank’s blockchain. This could be extended further. For 
example, a smart contract on the tax office blockchain could review income and tax payment records at 
the end of each financial year and calculate tax refunds. The potential for reducing the stress and effort 
required by workers, employers, and public agencies in managing the overheads associated with short-
term crowdwork assignments is enormous and thus-far, largely unrealised. The fully distributed, 
peer-to-peer characteristics of blockchain are likely to be a potentially limiting factor on the storage 
or large volumes of complex transactions as these would need to be replicated across the nodes in the 
network.  
Communication: As with payments, rules governing communication can be embedded in smart 
contracts, and records showing communication has taken place can be treated as ‘transactions’, with 
the properties of trust and irreversibility.  
Task ethics: It is not clear that blockchain technology could control whether the tasks issued were 
ethical. It is possible that irreversibility and networked integrity would make tasks easier to audit 
by regulatory bodies. However, in principle, tasks issued on AMT are stored digitally and therefore 
auditable. Overtime, favourable audits would contribute to the requester’s reputation 
4.2 Worker Related 
Privacy and identity management: This is a major area of potential contribution that blockchain 
technology can make to crowdwork, particularly in conjunction with hybrid chains using cross-
chain protocols. Transparency with pseudonymity means that workers can be identified by a 
number and do not need to reveal their full identity in order to confirm their credentials, past work 
history, and reputation record. This could protect workers against all kinds of unconscious bias, based 
on (for example) being female, disabled, or having a clearly ‘foreign’ name. On the requesters’ side, ‘CV 
fraud’ or ‘CV-inflation’ would be almost impossible as CV transaction entries could be transparent, 
trusted and irreversible. Claimed credentials could be verified and trusted using cross-chain 
protocols to hybrid chains managed by educational institutions or industry bodies. Records of 
training completed could also be trusted. In combination with reputation records generated from 
completed jobs, in combination these capabilities would greatly reduce the complexity and risk of 
managing a crowd-based workforce, as well as providing workers with a trusted and irreversible 
work history in conjunction with anonymity and privacy based on pseudonymity.  
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Reputation management: The capabilities above roll up into much more trusted and equitable 
reputation management systems. At present, workers reputations are tied to the platform on which they 
have the majority of their experience. Interblockchain communication might allow transfer of reputation 
records. While the functionalities we describe offer the possibility of reducing unnecessary and spurious 
risks to workers reputations such as those inherent in the AMT process, there are many complexities.  It 
is likely that reputation management systems would need to be fairly sophisticated if they were to replace 
current HR processes such as reference checking. There are many imponderables associated with this 
possible future. For example, there may be things that workers would legitimately prefer not to be 
transparent about. Would workers be anxious about raising questions if they knew each question 
would create a communication record? Might too many communication records create a negative 
impression?  Would a history of attempting and failing skill tests then taking training be perceived 
negatively or positively by requesters? Might different crowdwork blockchains include different terms 
of service regarding how much information was transparent and required transaction records to be 
posted to the network? There is a great deal of judgement required by both workers and requesters in 
answering these kind of questions, and it is judgement of a rather different kind to that required when 
attending a job interview.  
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
These issues provide many challenges for the future of work. On the one hand, ‘piece work’ – digital or 
otherwise, is becoming more common, with ‘zero hour contracts’ being introduced in low paid retail 
areas, and many jobs that have been traditionally recognised as professions, such as nursing, teaching, 
and web design, are increasingly casualised. Skilled jobs, as well as unskilled jobs, are beginning to 
appear in crowdwork platforms. On the other hand, tolerance by workers and the general public for 
exploitative crowdwork practices is decreasing, more so in some countries than others. We expect that 
there will be considerable diversity in workforce models, both between and within countries and labour 
markets. We are not so bold as to make predictions as to how these will develop, or how regulated they 
will be.  
The major contribution of our paper is to show that blockchain technology enables new ways of 
managing some of the workcontext issues associated with crowdwork. The discretion afforded to 
requesters currently by AMT could be greatly reduced. Overall, applying blockchain technologies to the 
functionality offered by sites such as Faircrowd.work could make crowdwork more democratised, more 
equitable, more transparent, and with less power held by brokers and the requesters. Unconscious biases 
against certain classes of employees could be eliminated. Claiming (and checking) reputations, 
credentials and work history could be automated and, more importantly, trusted, reducing many hiring 
overheads and allowing crowdwork to be used in increasingly skilled contexts. Even issues like tax and 
superannuation for crowdworkers could be managed. It does not take much imagination to project these 
trends into very large potential changes in the management of work-places. 
The greatest contributions relate to the contractual and transactional aspects of work – deciding what 
constitutes reasonable terms in the first place remains a social and political process. For example 
blockchain-based smart contracts could manage contracts based on different pay-rates and tax-rates 
depending on country of residence; in reality, workers from low-wage countries may be prevented from 
bidding for work in high-wage countries, as happens with AMT at present.  It is also arguable the extent 
to which complete transparency is necessary or required. Blockchain technology may permit an 
irreversible record of every communication between worker and requester to be created and distributed 
to every node on the network, but it is not clear that this is necessary or desirable. Therefore the decision 
as to what constitutes a ‘blockchain worthy’ transaction record will also still be a social process. In 
private or hybrid chains, while transactions on the network will be subject to the general properties of 
blockchain transactions, that does not mean that anyone will have entry to the network. Some private 
networks may be very tightly controlled. It is easy to imagine that people with records on a hypothetical 
‘Harvard’ blockchain may have access to opportunities that others will not. There is nothing inherently 
democratising about blockchain technology that will address these sorts of inequalities.  
Blockchain technology offers considerable potential for supporting new processes and practices for 
managing crowdwork in a way that affords some workcontext protections for workers without incurring 
excessive overhead costs. While our scenarios are speculative, it is not the technology, but the social 
processes and social accords that limit their realisation at present. It is essential that these issues are 
debated, so that new, ethical workcontext management approached can be developed that leverage new 
technologies such as blockchain to cushion some of the potentially negative effects of highly casualised 
crowdwork.  
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